Infantry

Index > The Finnish Army in WWII > Infantry

Infantry

Before the war

As war approached, Finland's military elite new that there would be no shortage of Russians marching from the motherland to fight the Finnish military- primarily the Finnish infantry. Knowing that their troops would be outnumbered, infantry training was exhaustive, in an attempt to concentrate more on the quality of the troop than on the quantity of troops. It quickly became clear that the average Finnish infantryman was much better trained than their Russian counterpart. One such example is the fact that the average Russian soldier only fired their rifle three (3) times before deployment to the Finnish front. Much of their training was focused more on indoctrination than on simple, field operations.

After extensive training and use of earlier models of the Mosin Nagant rifle to include the original m/91 and the Finn-modified m/27, the Finns were arming most infantrymen with some variant of this prolific bolt-action rifle. As the ware approached, the newest upgraded model of the Mosin Nagant, the m/28-30 or "Pystykorva" was being issued to infantrymen, however, in a limited number.

Like many of the branches of the Finnish military, the army's infantrymen were not as well equipped as they could have been. Every category of infantry weapon-handguns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, sub-machine guns and, even, anti-tank guns-were a melting pot of arms from throughout Europe and the world. Arms from Belgium, England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the United States and, of course, Russia, were all part of the international flavor present in every Finnish arms depot. Logistics of supplying the myriad of ammunition calibers to troops in the field, as well as ongoing repair and maintenance of these many varied weapons, would cause in Finnish blood throughout the war.

The Winter War

As the Winter War began, the Finnish army experience many difficulties-due in large part to the difference in season between the actual beginning of the conflict and the expected season included in the pre-war defense plans. For example, it had been expected that the Karelian lakes would function as a natural barrier against the Russians and that the scarce and poorly maintained road system would not be able to support large tank columns and troop marches. It being Winter, the frozen lakes became unexpected routes for attackers and the snow-packed roads became beneficial for tank and troop movements. Despite these unexpected disadvantages, there were benefits to the war beginning in the winter months. Most importantly, the Finns were much more acclimated to winter warfare than their Russian counterparts, in part because at the time most Finnish men were outdoor laborers and knew how to dress for the harsher season as well as most having been trained to ski. More benefits of this winter warfare, were the stores of winter equipment in army depots as well as extensive training in using the winter terrain as cover.

All of these benefits quickly became apparent to the under prepared Russians who began to refer to Finnish winter tactics as the "belaja smert" or the "white death." Though referred to often as a description for what was in store for troop on the Finnish front, the term was actually used to describe a specific tactic-a small platoon of about five snow-suited, Finnish infantry who would appear, as if out of nowhere, without a sound, from tree lines, to wreak havoc amongst Russian troops armed with sub-machine guns and traditional puukko fighting knives.

Another effective tactic utilized by the Finnish Army during the Winter War was referred to as the "motti" tactic. In summary, motti was a strategy whereby Finnish troops would surround an enemy unit making their presence obvious. The surrounded troops, in a panic, would expend their ammunition at which time the Finns would utilize the little artillery they had at their disposal to divide the larger unit into smaller pockets of troops and defeat them easily in these smaller numbers. The containment used in the motti tactic further allowed quick and easy capture of weapons and equipment from fallen enemy troops in a small area, augmenting the Finns limited supplies.

Though, the Finnish Army did not have any "true" snipers, history proves a few infantrymen who proved their sharp-shooting prowess. One of the best known is Simo Häyhä, a farmer and security guard who fought in the battle of Kollaa. Throughout the Winter War Häyhä secured 272 kills with his Mosin Nagant rifle and nearly as many with a sub-machine gun. He fought until the final months of the conflict when he was wounded on the chin by an Russian explosive shell. He was later recognized by both Finland and Sweden, who presented him with a rifle for his extraordinary skill in battle.

The Continuation War

After the short cease-fire as the Continuation War began, the Finns became known for their day-long marches and reckless "jumps" across the backwoods. With the eradic nature of the jumping tactics, many villages were captured by Finnish troops nearly unharmed by the attacks. These surprise attacks would force Russian troops into quick retreat, no providing them enough time to ransack buildings and fortifications. In the summer of 1944, during the Great Retreat Battles, the Russians used these same tactics against the Finns with similar success.

TOP